from a post-Derridean perspective. Assuming then, with Derrida, that any instance of presence is composed in a kind of stretching between the retention of an immemorial past that was never present and the projection towards a future which is without identity, what follows proposes a rather different kind of 'état présent', namely a survey of recent texts by still living and writing French philosophers whose profound engagements with deconstruction date back to their earliest careers. Thinkers such as François Laruelle, Jean-Luc Nancy, Bernard Stiegler, and Catherine Malabou have taken up and developed deconstruction in ways which echo Derrida's thought but which, at the same time, emerge as distinctly un-Derridean. So what follows will show how each of these four thinkers have transformed the deconstructive legacy in their most recent works. It will also situate these works within the more general context of the contemporary critical and scholarly reception of each thinker. This will yield an image of the present state of post-deconstructive thought and criticism which foregrounds the non-identity of deconstruction, its past, its 'present', and its possible futures. The image, admittedly partial, which emerges here is perhaps surprising insofar as these thinkers embrace, in very different ways, a dimension of material immanence or worldly existence which return them to (albeit entirely novel) kinds of realism or ontological discourse, modes of thinking that Derrida would no doubt have questioned or refused. 4 The materialist, realist, or (quasi-)ontological inflection of these four thinkers has produced scholarly responses which have increasingly opened humanities-oriented, critical work onto engagements with the sciences, with ecology and the environment, or with physical and biological existence. Alongside wider developments over the last twenty years that go under the names of 'new materialism', 'speculative realism', 'eco-criticism', or even 'animal studies', the recent development and critical-philosophical reception of Laruelle, Nancy, Stiegler, and Malabou can arguably be said to have produced (however unlikely this may seem) something like a post-Continental or post-deconstructive naturalism. 5 Such a turn towards the sciences and a concern with the physical or the biological is paralleled in areas such as cognitive criticism and cognitive literary studies that aim to move beyond or explicitly contest the legacies of (post-)structuralist and deconstructive 'theory'. Within UK French studies the most accomplished and brilliant example of this would be Terence Cave's Thinking with Literature: Towards a Cognitive Criticism. 6 The naturalistic turn that can be identified in the thought of Laruelle, Nancy, Stiegler, and Malabou, is one which is shared, albeit with a very different orientation, with cognitive criticism. Contrasting this recent past of Derrida-influenced thought and its reception with emerging trends in cognitive criticism allows for the present state of post-deconstructive criticism to be 4 Nevertheless, Derrida's thinking has been very much pursued along the lines outlined in relation to the four thinkers treated here. See, for example, Eco-deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental Philosophy, ed. by Mathias Fritsch, Philip Lynes, and David Wood (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018). addressed not in the identity of its contemporary moment but rather in the opening lines of its possible futures.
Best known since the late 1990s for his 'non-philosophy', François Laruelle has described his thinking as a form of 'déconstruction "non-heideggerienne"'.
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Rather than untying metaphysical foundations through a deconstruction of phenomenological presence or 'being-in-the-world', Laruelle builds his nonphilosophical thought on a radicalization of immanence (via Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, and above all Michel Henry), one which refuses, or rather transcends, the logic of differance in favour of a complex affirmation of the identity of the real. The logic of representation, metaphysical foundationalism, and hierarchical binarism that Derrida ascribes to logocentrism, Laruelle ascribes to philosophy as a whole. The non-philosophical affirmation of an immanent real that resists or is indifferent to any and all philosophical representation becomes the means by which he deconstructs the oppositions and hierarchies of metaphysics. His most recent thought perhaps most clearly reflects the post-deconstructive naturalistic turn identified here. La Philosophie non-standard draws heavily on the vocabulary and conceptuality of quantum mechanics, taking it out of its specific usage in experimental science and using it to give a generic formal or topological framework for his thinking. 8 More recently, however, the themes of ecology and of the human-animal relation have become a central concern both for Laruelle himself and for those drawing inspiration from him. So, for instance, Anthony Paul Smith's A Non-Philosophical Theory of Nature brings together scientific and ecological thinking with philosophy and theology in order completely to rethink our understanding of nature.
9 Smith addresses some of the most fundamental historical problems relating to our philosophically and theologically inflected conceptions of nature and thereby recasts the very meaning of the terms 'nature' and 'natural' in the context of a renewed ecological perspective. John Ó Maoilearca's All Thoughts Are Equal takes inspiration from Laruelle's non-philosophical method in order to explore a radical equality of thought in which philosophy's relation to the real sits side by side with other aesthetic forms (most notably film) and where, most decisively, the human animal and the non-human animal are equalized in relation to a generic, immanent, and non-human real that determines or causes both equally. 10 This equalization of thought is also borne out in other scholars' explorations of Laruelle's non-philosophical thinking and its implications for the organization of knowledge across the humanities and beyond.
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This gesture of equalization does not, however, imply a generalized collapse into sameness or homogeneity. Rather -and this is most notable innovation of Laruelle's non-Heideggerian deconstruction -differential relations, or the structure of différance more generally, are understood as being both determined by (in-the-last-instance, Laruelle will say), and equalized in relation to, an entirely indeterminate, non-, or undetermined immanent real. In this way all the possible metaphysical hierarchies or binary oppositions of philosophy find themselves neutralized or superseded since they are all equally placed back into a contingent relation with a radically undetermined immanence. Laruelle's most recently published book, En-dernière-humanité, sheds light upon and further explains the non-philosophical logic of this thinking.
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The aim of En-dernière-humanité is to 'expliquer le règne écologique humain de la vie par une expérience de pensée reliant l'homme à l'Univers'. 13 The characterization of this 'explication' as an 'expérience de pensée', implying as it does both an experience and an experimental gesture of thought, needs to be taken seriously. It should be recalled that the entirety of Laruelle's non-philosophy hinges on two simple axioms that are the condition of his thought experiments. First, that philosophy is, as it were, constitutively or structurally defined by its ambition to conceptualize the real and therefore by its representational posture vis-à-vis the real. Second, that non-philosophy is a thinking that positions itself outside of this structure or posture by deciding to take the real as an instance which cannot be in any way conceptualized or represented. The real is axiomatically understood, but not determined as such, as a radical immanence, prior to all worldly manifestation, transcendence, and differentiation, one that escapes every and all determination (as, for example, empiricity or Being, but also as differance or alterity). The initial premise of En-dernière-humanité is that ecology, as it is traditionally thought and practised, is permeated through and through with philosophical assumptions, differentials, and oppositions: 'Les fondements de l'écologie traditionnelle sont différentiels et naturalistes, enclos dans la différence écologique.' 14 The human, taken as a known, determined, and determinable instance, is understood as part (or effectively the centre) of a web of relations that includes all the varieties of animal and vegetable and thereby constitutes the ecological environment. All other instances within this web are known and constituted (scientifically, naturalistically, and/or conceptually-metaphysically) on the basis of the human understood as the knowing animal whose ability to know is circumscribed and guaranteed in the last instance by philosophy. According to Laruelle, traditional ecology, in its initial determination of an image of the human and its thinking of the biological world as a web of differential relations (ultimately and unavoidably) centred upon the human, repeats the very structure of philosophy in its ambition to know or determine the real. 15 By dint of this repetition, traditional ecology ends up being hopelessly mired in antinomies and hierarchical-metaphysical oppositions (most notably that between the human and the animal) from whose violent and exploitative consequences it cannot extricate itself despite its best efforts and intentions. As indicated above, the cornerstone of the non-philosophical gesture has always been, for Laruelle, to treat the real, by way of an axiomatic decision, as radically undetermined and undeterminable. Since, arguably, philosophy has always founded itself in an image of the human understood as that entity among entities uniquely capable of philosophizing, non-philosophy has always also treated the human and 'human nature' as radically undetermined and undeterminable. The task of non-philosophical ecology, or non-ecology, will therefore be to recast the human-centred web of ecological difference through a gesture of thought that undetermines the human; the task will be to 'renoncer à la "nature humaine" et même à sa représentation philosophique' and to do so in such way that the human 'apparaît comme sujet aléatoire indéterminé en son visage humain'. 16 The two key terms that orientate this task are what Laruelle calls 'l'endernière-humanité' and 'l'Univers'.
What non-ecology does is to treat the human, not as a more or less positively or negatively defined identity or differential in relation to the world and its economy or ecology of beings (and Being), but rather as an undetermined instance that is caused or determined, ultimately and in the last instance, by the (itself undetermined) immanence of the real. Laruelle names this undetermined real, 'l'Univers'. The name of the human no longer refers to anything that has an essence or that can define itself within the field of worldly differences; it is defined as human only in its non-definition and in relation to the undetermined real that is its cause. In this way it takes the name of 'l'en-dernière-humanité'. Laruelle's 'Univers' is not the phenomenological world of differentiated entities that have their (non-)identity in difference, but is rather a dimension anterior to phenomenal manifestation or appearance. In the 'Univers' the human and all those other instances (animal and vegetable) that were hitherto defined in relation to the human, are equally subjected to an undetermination in the last instance: 'L'Univers n'a pas de nature humaine métaphysique mais une multiplicité d'états clonés, de clonages vécus-sans-vie qui habitent l'Univers comme la nouvelle Terre des vivants.' 17 The language of clones and cloning here does not refer to its accepted scientific meaning but is a non-philosophical means of naming all the instances of (non-)ecological thought, not as differential entities, but as instances placed solely in relation to the undetermined real that is their determination or cause (ultimately and 'in-the-last-instance').
So non-ecology substitutes what is always and ultimately human-centred economy of Being-, or beings-in-the-world for a non-human-centred universality or Universe of the real in relation to which all entities are undetermined (metaphysically, philosophically) in the last instance. This is Laruelle's non-Heideggerian deconstruction, the experience or experiment of thought by means of which traditional ecology can extricate itself from the play of differences and oppositions which ultimately centre themselves on a metaphysics or philosophical image of the human. This is less a philosophical representation of the world, of being, or of the real, and far more 'la construction d'une problématique ou d'un "bâtiment" destiné à abriter des espèces théoriques'. 18 As an experimental framework of thought this 'bâtiment' would seek to admit all the entities of traditional ecology on an equal footing and resolve the antinomies, oppositions, and hierarchies that attend its philosophical enframing. As Laruelle puts it, the instance of the 'dernière-humanité impose l'égalité de l'homme, de l'animal et du végétal'. 19 On this basis Laruelle seeks to affirm non-ecology as a frame of thought that will also open onto, or cross into, a differently configured ethics for the regulation of relations between the human, animal, and the vegetable.
Laruelle's non-philosophical ecology or non-ecology can be taken as the most idiosyncratic expression of what is at stake more generally in the various transformations of deconstruction identified here. As will become clear, for each of these four thinkers, the structure of différance, which, for Derrida, is the very condition of possibility and impossibility of metaphysical foundations and philosophical oppositions (and of experience per se), has been transposed onto a different terrain or topological space. In the case of Laruelle -and to this extent his thinking represents the most radical transformation of Derrida's thought -differance and the play of presence-absence or possibility-impossibility that it inaugurates, is placed back into a contingent relation to the radically undetermined identity of the real which is the determination-in-the-last-instance of all the relational differences that are engaged within spatio-temporal or worldly manifestation and appearance. In the case of Nancy, Stiegler, and Malabou the logic of differance and its interruption of presence is arguably maintained because all three continue to think in terms of material, worldly forms or differential relations that persist in excess of any logic of self-identity or presence. The logic of differance is however transposed onto the relational articulations of 'sexistence', 'organology', and 'plasticity' respectively. Despite their differences, these post-deconstructive transformations or transpositions all in one way or another orientate thought towards a dimension of the material or the real, one which both precedes thought and which constitutes or determines it as such. It is this orientation that has guided so much of the critical reception of these thinkers in recent years towards engagements with the world, with the organic and inorganic, with natural and artificial, engagements which by far exceed questions concerning the play of signification or phenomenological and intentional consciousness.
The equalizing gesture that was central to Laruelle's non-ecology has also been a core concern of Jean-Luc Nancy's philosophy and its reception. Equality has been either an implicit or an explicit concern over the last ten years of research that has responded to Nancy's thinking of community, singular-plural being, or being with. 20 At the same time a great deal of writing on and around Nancy's work has continued to focus on specific strands or concerns of his philosophy such as Christianity or ethics. 21 Other writing, however, has combined an interest in the ethical or political dimensions of Nancean philosophy with an interrogation and further development of its longstanding concerns with aesthetics. 22 In a further development of these trends, some of the most recent scholarship in this area combines these political and ethical concerns with an aesthetics or poetics that is ordered more towards the ecological or eco-critical. 23 As was the case with Laruelle, the development of Nancy's own philosophical trajectory in his most recent publication reflects this current trend.
Nancy's thinking of sense and of being-singular-plural (or being-with) can be understood as a recasting of Derridean differance into a quasi-ontological, differently material, and distinctly worldly or existential register. 24 In light of this, Sexistence needs to be viewed as a further elaboration of Nancean co-existence that draws explicitly upon Freud's theory of the drives and upon a Nietzsche-inspired understanding of a desiring or 'pulsional' becoming. 25 Co-existence here becomes 'une existence pulsionnelle différencié et dirigée vers d'autres êtres (ou "objets") que le "moi" attaché à la masse du "ça"'. 26 What is ultimately at stake in this sexuation of existence is an attempt to think materiality in terms of a certain kind of energetics or conceptualization of energy: 'une éner-gie inassignable, indéterminée, mais qui pousse et qui pulse, qui impulse le monde et nous en lui, à lui'. 27 In the first instance this 'energy' is not some kind of fundamental stuff or potentiality harboured within each entity or being, but is rather the relational force that directs any given singular instance towards another and in such a way as to constitute them as the singular plurality of being, of being-with, or what Nancy has also previously called 'être-à': '[I]l y a une pulsion primordiale qui pourtant ne précède pas à l'exister mais en lui force et forme sa jetée, son expulsion à être'. 28 In this context Nancy continues and further elaborates his understanding of existence as an irreducible exteriority (to thought, to subjectivity, or to any logos or restricted economy of being).
As an irreducible exteriority, existence is thought by Nancy, by way of a very specific and aporetic thinking at the limit of thought, as anterior to, and in excess of, the limited sphere of the human and of the human being that nevertheless participates in such an existence. It is here that something like a Nancean naturalism emerges. As he did previously in Le Sens du monde, 29 Nancy deploys in Sexistence a cosmological register, initially by taking the physical example of a pulsar and using the image of an energetic pulse or pulsation as a figure for existence in general. Evoking pulsars literally as celestial bodies that emit intermittent bursts of radiation, Nancy continues in more figural terms:
Il est permis de dire que chaque existence est un tel corps céleste, permis aussi de se demander jusqu'à quel point toutes les réalités du monde ne participent pas d'une telle pulsation. C'est-à-dire en fait jusqu'à quel point toute réalité (vivant ou non) n'est pas fondamentalement solidaire d'une expulsion de rien vers rien.
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A scientific and literal register is overlaid here with a (quasi-)ontological and figural register to describe a purely relational existence which is without any foundation in a preceding substance or essence and which is articulated in a groundlessness or 'rien' of a pulsing of each singular instance 'to' another, a pulsing which constitutes existence as such.
In the light of this overlaying of scientific-physical and ontological-figural language, one might question the exact status of the 'energy' that Nancy so consistently invokes as the 'pulsion primordiale' of sexistence. On the one hand, since this energy is 'inassignable, indéterminée', it does not appear to refer to the interrelationship or interconversion of energy in physical systems as known and measured by science in the equations of thermodynamics. On the other, Nancy appears to be talking about nothing other than material existence and the continuity of this pulsional and 'sexual' energy across all forms of life and matter: 'Le sexe fait continuité avec la vie, avec l'animal, avec le végétal, pourquoi pas avec le pulsar?' 31 Energy, here, must be understood as being always in some way sexual, but most specifically in the original Greek sense of energeia meaning the effective exercise or actualization of a force. 32 Yet to claim that all existence, cosmic, material, and vital, is somehow sexual may appear to be affirming a rather outlandish or implausible pansexualism. Nancy qualifies his proposal in the following terms: 'Bien entendu le non-vivant -pierre, électron, gaz. . . -ne peut être considéré comme un sujet de désir: mais il s'agit justement de l'inverse, il s'agit du désir en tant que poussée par quoi ça existe.' 33 The energetics or impulsional quality of singular-plural existence, of sexistence, is that which makes the sexual and desiring entities of life possible in the first instance and should therefore be seen as that which makes the emergence of life almost inevitable: 'La vie n'est pas seulement hors de soi: c'est son être que de l'être. Et comme la vie sort elle-même de la matière non-vivante, cette dernière ne peut pas être pensée sans cette éventualité ou sans cette possibilité.' 34 In this way biological and sexuated life can be reasonably viewed as a not at all surprising or implausible emergence from cosmological and geo-physical processes.
So what is presented here is an image of the cosmos or of the universe in which the human and human sexuality are placed in continuity with 'sexuated' existence more generally and viewed as an emergence from that existence. 35 Sex in Nancy's sexistence renders 'indissociables l'individu et l'espèce, l'espèce humaine et le vivant, les vivants et l'univers' (ibid.). This is not an economy of existence that can be gathered into the unity of a logos, a created metaphysical concept, nor a hypostasis of presence (hence it is only ever framed as a quasi-ontology). Neither can it be recuperated into the totalizing horizon of a quantitative-scientific cosmology or evolutionary ecology (hence it is irreducible to any traditional philosophical naturalism). It is a thinking at the limit of thinking that poses existence as an irreducible excess over thought and the restricted sphere of the human, whilst at the same time situating thought and the human (whatever that may mean) in a continuity with that wider non-human (s)existence. 36 It is in this way that Nancy has consistently carried over the Derridean deconstruction of presence into a register that Derrida himself always refused, a register that is (quasi-)ontological, material, and existential. Yet this is an existence which, in its coming to presence, always maintains itself as an irreducible exteriority to any restricted economy of subjectivity, thought, or logos. At the same time, and as was the case with Laruelle's non-ecology, what emerges here is also a non-human-centred and radically equalizing thought that is ordered toward a rethinking of the natural universe.
The philosophical perspectives elaborated in the most recent works of Bernard Stiegler and Catherine Malabou resonate in broad terms with that of Laruelle inasmuch as they both embrace an immanent materiality that is shorn of any possibility of transcendence or ideality. They also resonate more closely with Nancy in that their thinking describes a material, worldly real that is relational or differential. These resonances are reflected in the recent philosophical receptions of both. So, for instance, ongoing critical work inspired or informed by Stiegler's thinking of technology once again reflects a naturalistic turn, although Stiegler also 34 Ibid., p. 75. 35 Nancy affirms sexuality, like existence, as irreducibly plural; see Sexistence, p. 139. 36 Both Nancy and Laruelle, of course, engage extensively with the fact that what has been called the human, understood now as an 'animal-parlant' or 'en-dernière-humanité' respectively, is the unique site within 'sexistence' or the 'Univers' from which either being or a non-philosophical axiomatics of the real can be articulated. This, arguably, gives the animal-parlant or humanity-of-the-last-instance a restricted logical priority from the perspective of thought but not a sexistential or real priority from the perspective of the cosmos/Univers. tends to be sceptical of all existing forms of naturalism.
37 This is borne out in Dans la disruption, a work in which Stiegler develops a 'libidinal ecology' of the contemporary world, taking the term 'Anthropocene' as a central point of reference to describe the historical/geological epoch into which we have now entered. 38 His primary concern is the status and future of human thought, reason, intellect, and collective consciousness, or noesis. He interrogates the formation of noesis within a complex ecology of the biological and the cultural, the organic and the inorganic, the physical and the technical. He explicitly indicates the post-deconstructive context of this concern:
Ce qui reste à produire à partir de la déconstruction derridienne de l'Abbau heideggerien, c'est une organologie rendant possible une pharmacologie positive de la situation présente de 'monstruosité' qu'est l'absence de l'époque, et qui doit passer par une 'histoire du supplément' effectivement faite et pensée comme exosomatisation. (Ibid., p. 416) Articulated in Stiegler's rather technical neologisms, what this sentence effectively says is that Derrida's thinking of the 'supplément' needs to be developed into an account of exteriorized technical prosthetics ('une organologie') which historically sediment, form, and reform human memory, meaning, and consciousness, and whose systematic organization has a history which, if understood and recounted correctly, will offer us the key to coming to terms with and responding to our present state of global crisis.
The ethical and political stakes of this endeavour hang on the 'pharmocological' character of the technological systems which condition consciousness. They are both poison and cure. That is to say, to the extent that Stiegler diagnoses a deadening, flattening, and homogenization of noesis brought about by the calculative logic of the digital, informational, and algorithmic technologies that condition contemporary society and economy, he also holds out the possibility that these technologies can be re-appropriated by a different and renewed form of rationality. He articulates this diagnosis in the following terms:
[L]'Anthropocène, réquisitionnant la science en vue de la transformer en technologie [. . .] en vient à la court-circuiter structurellement en la détournant radicalement, c'est-à-dire: en vient à remplacer l'activité noétique comprise comme passage à l'acte transgressif de la raison par un entendement automatique qui fonctionne sans aucune raison, que ce soit comme big data ou comme deep learning.
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In Stiegler's hands the Anthropocene is not just a scientifically emergent category that describes a new geological era, it is also the epoch where science becomes subordinate to techno-science and to a technocratic order of calculation that permeates all our Such a diagnosis relies on Stiegler's more general understanding of technical systems and their relation to both biological and social life, what has here been dubbed a 'libidinal ecology'. In this context he draws on mid-twentieth-century thinkers of biology and/or technology such as Gilbert Simondon and Georges Canguilhem in order to chart a complex series of processes through which the biological, the technical, and the social (or noetic) interact and reciprocally condition each other. He notes:
L'organe cérébral noétique est plongé dans l'économie libidinale de cette différance noétique qui le forme comme organe d'un individu qui n'est noétique qu'en ceci qu'il est strictement social -puisqu'il est constitué par l'identification, l'idéalisation, la sublimation et le surmoi, qui n'ont rien de proprement cérébral, quoiqu'en passant par le cerveau. 41 What is being charted here is a process whereby our engagements with the world, mediated by technical systems, form both the structures of social life and the cerebral and neural networks that make us both individually and collectively what we are. What Stiegler is uncovering and elaborating is essentially a processual dynamic which describes the interaction of neuroplasticity with social structures and technological systems, an interaction that forms the core of our ability to think and reason, that is to say, the core of our noetic life. His gambit is that such a reflexive philosophical turn towards the very conditions of philosophical thought and noesis more generally will allow for an overcoming of the contemporary wasting or flattening of reason and for the emergence of another, more critical, and plural logic.
Although, like Laruelle, Stiegler refuses or rejects traditional philosophical naturalism (which he sees as constitutively allied to the technocratic rationality of the Anthropocene via cognitivism and its avatars), the term can once again be seen to have a certain purchase or pertinence when applied to his thinking. Dans la disruption can be said to imply a naturalization of human thought insofar as it orientates itself around the charting of this processual continuity between the biological and the noetic, their reciprocal mediation via the technical or the organological, and their overall insertion into the libidinal ecology of the Anthropocene. Stiegler implies that Malabou's philosophy is too neuro-centric and therefore unable to account for such processual complexity and mediation. 42 Yet her latest work, published a year after Dans la disruption, suggests this is not the case. Heidegger, and much of the critical reception of her work has focused on this core aspect of her philosophy. 43 Her most singular and important innovation in relation to Derrida has been to displace his emphasis on alterity, undecidability, and signifying play onto the question of the groundlessness and transformability of material forms (physical, biological, or linguistic and cultural) such as they persist or survive in the wake of their deconstruction. For Malabou the exposure of any and all material forms to a future or futurity that is without identity results in their primordial and irreducible mutability or what she has termed plasticity. In this way Malabou, like Nancy, transposes the Derridean thinking of differance back into an ontological register, albeit, once again, a register which still operates outside any logic of self-identical presence. Malabou's work on the brain and neuroplasticity, Que faire de notre cerveau?, displaces this register further and more squarely onto the terrain of the biological. 44 Continuing and further radicalizing this displacement, her most recent thinking has focused on a philosophical interpretation of the science of epigenetics. 45 This has led to the exploration of what she herself has called 'le milieu entre vie biologique et vie symbolique', one which is predicated on what one could take to be the essentially naturalist claim that 'il n'y a qu'une seule vie, le symbolique et le biologique sont originairement et intimement mêlés'. 46 In this context brain plasticity (that is to say, the ability of neural networks to form and reform themselves throughout life) needs to be seen as a form of epigenesis, the collection of processes by which information contained in the genome is translated into the structures and comportments of biological organisms. In particular, the interaction of biochemical mechanisms and environmental influences play a key role in epigenetic processes. By situating brain plasticity explicitly within a wider processual and epigenetic horizon, Malabou arguably avoids the charge of neuro-centrism. In this context brain plasticity needs to be understood as the 'potentialité de l'architecture neuronale à être façonnée par les influences du milieu, de l'habitude ou de l'éducation [. . .]. Le cerveau est bien cet organe culturel, lieu d'articulation du biologique et du symbolique et possibilité originaire des "dispositions acquises".'
47 This perspective appears, in fact, to be rather close to that of Stiegler insofar as the brain emerges here as a specific site of articulation or passage within a much wider processual and inter-relational architecture, one which enables an interaction between the biological and the symbolic (the social or 'noetic' in Stiegler's terms). Malabou's perspective, however, is less immediately concerned with technological mediation and more oriented towards the way in which social-symbolic forms or horizons form the posture and behaviour of bodies and the ways in which bodily posture in turn forms or shapes neural networks: 'Les états physiques cérébraux sont en lien étroit avec la posture sociale des corps, avec la manière dont ils s'inscrivent dans l'espace de la communauté.' 48 She draws here on the thought of both Jean Piaget and Pierre Bourdieu and, in particular, makes use of the latter's concept of 'habitus' understood as 'les structures cognitives [que l'agent] met en oeuvre', and therefore as 'le produit de l'incorporation des structures du monde dans lequel il agit'. 49 Given that neural networks and physical brain states are formed in an interaction between a bodily orientation and the social-symbolic structures of any given historical world, Malabou concludes unequivocally that 'l'habitus est donc un dispositif à la fois biologique et social '. 50 It is worth noting that the major ethical and, by extension, political conclusion that Malabou draws from her arguments relates, as it did in her earlier book on the brain, to existential freedom. What plasticity signifies is that there is no order of existence, either biological or technological, that is securely (pre-)determined, (pre-)destined, or fully calculable on the basis of a pre-existing substance, essence, programme, or code (genetic or cybernetic). Plasticity, she concludes, 'peut être invoquée pour contredire toute prédestination, toute hiérarchisation dans l'accueil esthétique et cognitif des formes'. 51 To this extent, the entanglement she discerns between the biological and the symbolic further aligns her thinking with Stiegler's ethico-political concerns. Throughout their most recent books, both articulate a strong critique of algorithmic rationality, cognitivism, and its associated forms of knowledge, given that such forms may be inflected towards the purely calculable or towards a calculative order and the normativity that such an inflection would impose (this is a critique, of course, that recalls the privilege Derrida accords to the 'incalculable' and the 'undecidable'). At the same time Malabou elaborates a wider vision of thought and consciousness which places it in a continuity (albeit a complex one) with biological life, and in this she can be aligned not only with Stiegler but also with the wider ecological and cosmological perspectives of Nancy and Laruelle.
Malabou's invocation of plasticity as that which contradicts any possibility of prior essence, predestination or hierarchization 'dans l'accueil esthétique et cognitif des formes' brings this overview of post-deconstructive thought to the question of how the four philosophical works that have been sketched out here and set within the context of the critical reception of each thinker might initiate new possibilities and perspectives for aesthetics or literary-theoretical and critical discourse. As was indicated at the outset, the naturalistic turn articulated in the recent work of 48 Laruelle, Nancy, Stiegler, and Malabou places them in a relation of both proximity and distance with developments in cognitive criticism. The future significance of this turn for literary criticism can perhaps best be evaluated through a comparison with Terence Cave's elaboration of cognitive literary studies in Thinking with Literature.
Malabou's naturalization of the transcendental moment within thought and its recasting as plasticity or epigenesis unequivocally affirms that 'il n'y a pas de programmation biologique de l'esthétique de la réception'. 52 In this context she appears to offer a somewhat negative assessment of cognitive or neuro-criticism: 'Le danger de telles procédures d'interprétation tient à leur visée réductionniste et leur projet d'uniformisation des esprits, censés réagir tous de la même façon aux stimuli.' 53 The charge of reductionism is perhaps the most common made against cognitivist forms of criticism and interpretation. That such forms can also be accused of a structural normativity or homogenization once again aligns Malabou with Stiegler and his critique of the rationality characteristic of the Anthropocene. Despite Malabou's apparently critical stance vis-à-vis cognitive criticism in general it is nevertheless clear that she shares a considerable amount of ground with Cave. Cave's perspective embeds itself in a resolutely naturalist framework and so, like Malabou and the other post-deconstructive thinkers treated here, he understands the human and human culture to be in a continuity with the physical and biological world. In this regard his cognitivism is ecological, albeit in a very different manner from Laruelle's non-ecology or Stiegler's libidinal ecology: 'Cognition itself is a feature of the environment. Humans live in a cognitive ecology.' 54 And, like both Malabou and Stiegler (but also Nancy in earlier works such as Corpus 55 ), he places a key emphasis on the body and its orientation within, or disposition towards, its surrounding environment, and does so in a manner which resolutely overturns the 'mind-body' distinction: 'The body, incessantly exposed to the ecologies that shape it, is in this account always continuous with the mind and its ecologies: thoughts and ideas are functions of a biological substratum.' 56 This essentially naturalist affirmation of a continuity between the biological and the cultural, between natural ecology and the realm of the mind, language, and the imagination, allows Cave to develop an understanding of literature and of literary language that bridges scientific and humanities discourses. He is able to refer to a range of cognitive theories in order to elaborate a set of conceptual tools for the understanding of what literature is and does as well as for a thinking of what literary criticism is and should do. Cave invokes 'the best literary criticism' as having always been 'a pragmatics' and argues that 'a cognitive methodology' must draw on 'the skills the best literary critics already have'. 57 In this way a key humanities practice benefits from, and is as it were underwritten by, 'the power of scientific methodologies' whilst at the same time preserving the 'ambition to devise methodologies specific to literature'. 58 Literary criticism at once takes authority from the sciences whilst maintaining the rights and privileges of its own aesthetic sphere.
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The similarity, but also and most obviously the difference, between Cave's cognitive criticism and the post-deconstructive 'naturalisms' sketched out here are evident in the specific theories that he selects in order to develop his cognitive critical language and methodology. These are, most importantly, 'affordance theory', 'relevance theory', and 'theory of mind theory'. The first borrows the term 'affordance' from James J. Gibson and understands affordances themselves as environmental features that offer 'potentialities for behaviours and adaptation' or more specifically as 'the potential uses an object or feature of the environment offers to a living creature'. 60 Affordances, understood in the broadest sense, include all natural features of the environment that may be put to use by animals but include also all the technologies, linguistic, and cultural forms that may be put to use by the human animal. To this extent Cave's 'affordance' ecology might initially seem to be very close to Stiegler's organology and the broader Stieglerian understanding of technics.
The accusation levelled at a cognitively inflected criticism that it is reductionist and restrictively normative is not one that can be fairly levelled at Cave. Throughout Thinking with Literature he demonstrates the richness of the cognitive critical approach to literature and to the aesthetic imagination more generally, and also explicitly underlines the pluralism of literary 'affordances' and the possibilities for thought that they open up. 61 What can be fairly said, however, is that Cave's cognitive criticism unequivocally, and at times quite explicitly, restores the (hitherto less pluralistic and often value-laden) norms of traditional positivist criticism, norms that were rejected by the structuralist and post-structuralist critical turn of the last decades of the twentieth century. These include, pre-eminently, authorial intentionality, the instrumental status of language, the 'realist' or mimetic function of literary texts, and the question of judgement in relation to literary value. 62 Indeed, Cave is sometimes also quite explicit about the resemblance of the pragmatics of cognitive literary criticism to well-established or 'classic "close reading"', the difference being that it 'uses a different perspective and a critically 58 Ibid., p. 155. 59 Cave consistently privileges literature as that which affords a special kind of fluid, plural, imaginative and truth-oriented cognition insofar as it is not tied to restricted use-value or 'concrete outcomes in the real world' (Thinking with Literature, p. 39; see also pp. 137, 144). Yet at the same time he rejects the eighteenth century, essentially Kantian, privileging of the aesthetic as a separate sphere (see for example pp. 7, 149). There may be something of a contradiction here despite Cave's affirmation of the 'gradient (or spectrum argument)' (p. 149). 60 63 More profoundly, what may be at stake here is (literary and literary-critical) agency and its relation to truth. Arguably this is where 'relevance theory' takes on a key role in the articulation of Cave's 'cognitive pragmatics'. He notes that relevance theory vigorously counters the view that language is exclusively a code consisting of fixed conventions. It is of course partly coded, but the coded elements are only a springboard for the limitless possibilities of nuanced expression that may be realized as speaker and interlocutor mutually exploit their respective mental resources and potential imaginings.
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In a stroke, relevance theory, underpinned by all the epistemological authority of a scientific and cognitivist approach, allows Cave, again quite explicitly, to break out of the Nietzschean 'prison house of language' and thereby to break free from all the other more recent theoretical paradigms that bind our inventions of truth into linguistic, discursive, or otherwise constructed forms. In this context 'mind', understood as a complex range of sensorimotor, affective, and neuro-cognitive engagements with the world, can be restored to its own autonomous agency, prior to linguistic or discursive coding, an agency that makes an instrumental use of language, and other natural, technical, or cultural forms (affordances) but which is not constituted or constructed by them. This retrieval of subjective agency, intentionality, and unproblematic referentiality is intimately bound up with a concern for truth, or what relevance theorist Dan Sperber has termed 'epistemic vigilance'. 65 Epistemic vigilance and the preservation of truth values turns out to be one of the most central concerns of Cave's cognitive critical perspective and his conception of literary value. 66 Here the retrieval of traditional critical norms allows for a move beyond, or superseding of, the (inter-)textualist paradigm of structuralism/post-structuralism and a return to a more or less empirical and empiricist grounding of truth. As Cave notes: '[T]he shifting logic of rhetorical figures, which could create epistemic anxiety, needs to be referred to truth values or more generally to a relation to the empirical world.' 67 So whilst the cognitive approach proposed in Thinking with Literature is far from being reductive or reductionist it can perhaps still be said to be normative insofar as it draws upon cognitive theories whose empiricist presuppositions allow the status and availability of empirical truth to be taken for granted. Cave draws upon these cognitive theories and their scientifically grounded authority and articulates them together with a well-established literary-critical pragmatics or practice that will be henceforth supplied with a new theoretical vocabulary. Yet he arguably does so in such a way as to restore, albeit in a more pluralist fashion, traditional literary-critical norms; norms which will find their authority in a renewed cognitive empiricism. While not detracting from the huge achievement and extraordinary scholarship of Thinking with Literature, I want to suggest that the post-deconstructive approaches elaborated here -naturalistic after a fashion and engaged with the sciences as they also are -would not allow for such an unproblematic restoration of critical norms and values.
All these approaches are opposed to the established philosophical naturalism which cognitive criticism presupposes. Laruelle's theoretical 'bâtiment' of non-ecology would immediately hold in suspension the most fundamental philosophical presuppositions, oppositions, and assumptions of Cave's 'cognitive ecology' and the (arguably profoundly metaphysical) evolutionary image of the human mind upon which it rests. The complex order of relationality that is articulated between the inorganic, the biological, and the symbolic/cultural in Nancy's sexistence, Stiegler's organology, and Malabou's epigenetic plasticity would resolutely call into question the specific understanding of agency, intentionality, and truth to which Cave's naturalistic cognitive empiricism appeals. This is not to say that sexistence, organology, and plasticity do not allow for instances of agency or autonomy in the wider relational and/or pulsional architectures of existence that each proposes. Nor does it mean that there is no room for a renewed and innovative thinking of truth, that is, of relations to, or determinations by, the real. It does mean, however, that these instances need to be thought outside of traditional empirical frameworks and in the context of new and different negotiations between philosophical or theoretical discourse and the sciences.
Philosophically and theoretically, the key question mark that hangs over Cave's cognitivism relates to the fact that the appeal to empiricism or a 'relation to the empirical world' is by no means unequivocally guaranteed within contemporary philosophy of science debate more generally nor, more specifically, by the full range of contemporary cognitive approaches and research. So, for instance, one might cite the work of the biologist Holk Cruse who has argued that our neural processes construct internal world models and that what we experience subjectively is the content of our internal world models rather than direct empirical sense information. 68 Here objective phenomena remain entirely subjective, or at least intersubjective, phenomena. Neuroscientific theory, in this instance at least, keeps us firmly within a variant of a neural-constructivist horizon in relation to experience: we may have broken out of the prison house of language therefore, but only thereby to have escaped into some kind of naturalized, biological, or neuralcognitive a priori. This is not at all incompatible with the model suggested by Malabou's thinking of epigenesis and neuro-plasticity and its naturalization of the Kantian transcendental. One can easily imagine Cruse's cognitive internal world models being plastically formed and reformed via the processes of bodily and socially engaged 'habitus' that were described in Métamorphoses de l'intelligence.
Cave's preferred cognitive theories fit perfectly with the aims of his critical pragmatics and with a wider interlocking framework of knowledge that marries cognitivism, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, and Anglo-American philosophy 68 of mind. This, arguably, is a framework that can be seen to permeate or even dominate the contemporary ordering or structuring of knowledge. Yet, as with Cruse's position, there are other fields of current biological research which do not so easily fit with the desire to restore more traditional forms of subjective agency, intentionality, mimesis, and empirical truth values. Most prominent among these would be the emergence over the last decade or so of biosemiotics. In his account of the 'biosemiotic turn' within biological thinking, Donald Favereau notes:
It is biosemiotics that will insist that in the study of biological agency of every kind, it is precisely the naturalistic establishment of sign relations that bridge subject-dependent experience [. . .] with the inescapable subject-independent reality of alterity that all organisms have to find some way to successfully perceive and act upon in order to maintain themselves in existence. 69 Favereau's characterization of biosemiotics would suggest that the traditional subject-object relation of empiricism is neither an adequate nor even barely sufficient means of describing biological agency. Biological agents always relate to their own internal and external environments through bio-chemical signalling and extended biosemiotic processes in ways that may be irreducible to any strictly empiricist epistemology. Yet at the same time, and by the same token, they are nevertheless always still and necessarily in some kind of real and meaningful (because biosemiotic) relation to their real surrounding world (and therefore to some order of 'reality' or truth). In this context, human technologies, language, symbolization, and (inter)textuality can understood as an, albeit highly complex, extension of biosemiotic signalling processes.
One can imagine a future naturalized and post-deconstructive criticism which could easily align the relational world of pulsional sense described by Nancy's sexistence with a biosemiotic perspective. Such a perspective would also be amenable to further co-articulation with Stiegler's libidinal ecology or with Malabou's epigenetic plasticity (and even by more circuitous routes with Laruelle's non-ecology). This opens up the possibility of positing or thinking something like a biosemiological (inter)textuality in which the physical processes of life and the symbolic dimensions of human technology, thought, language, and culture are understood as continuous and as continuously interacting with each other. In such a postdeconstructive context there would be no possibility of a return to stable and grounded instances of subjectivity or intentionality understood as self-identical sites and sources of meaning, nor to an unproblematic mimetic referentiality understood as a guarantor of purely empirical truth values. Yet biosemiotic processes are nothing if not referential and, as Favereau suggests, bridge subjectdependent and subject-independent experience. A criticism elaborated on the notion of biosemiological textuality would not in any way project thought into unbridled relativism or an unchecked play of referential possibility and meaning. Criticism may always nevertheless have to deal with the epistemic anxiety caused by 'the shifting logic of rhetorical figures' that emerge from language, textuality, and the complex biosemiotic processes in which they are embedded. It may also have to understand and accept more fully the abyssal decentring of identity, agency, and intentionality within such processes. Epistemic vigilance, however, need not be renounced. Now, and in the future, the exercise of such vigilance may be needed more than ever. The task of post-deconstructive criticism, as a future possibility, would be to explore yet further the interactions of the biological, the semiotic, and the symbolic understood as a complex biosemiological textuality determined by, or otherwise articulated as, the real. It is on this condition, perhaps, that something like epistemic vigilance may in its turn be made more viable and effective.
